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BILL COSBY, THE LUSTFUL DISPOSITION 
EXCEPTION, AND THE DOCTRINE OF CHANCES 
WESLEY M. OLIVER

 
On December 30, 2015, an affidavit of probable cause alleged that 
William H. Cosby, Jr., Ed.D., a comedian whose storied career spanned 
decades, committed aggravated indecent sexual assault upon Andrea 
Constand.
1
 For decades, women have been coming forward claiming to 
have been the victims of Cosby’s unwanted sexual advances, most of them 
claiming that Cosby drugged them and took advantage of them when they 
were in an unconscious state.
2
 Despite the number of accusers over 
decades, thus far only one criminal count has been announced. At this 
point, it appears that the statute of limitation would preclude an indictment 
charging any criminal acts against the other alleged victims.  
That does not mean that we have heard the last of the other accusers. 
Even though evidence of a defendant’s bad character is “not admissible for 
the purpose of proving the person acted in conformity therewith,”
3
 
common sense would dictate that a trier of fact should hear from the other 
victims who claim Cosby similarly assaulted them.  
What are the odds that one man could be falsely accused by fifty 
women? A few courts have asked exactly this question using something 
called the doctrine of chances, a rule that expressly considers the 
likelihood that the defendant is innocent of the present offense in light of 
what we know about his past. Rather than conducting such an analysis, 
however, a number of courts tend to merely admit all prior sexual 
misconduct under what is known as the lustful disposition exception. A 
number of other courts, such a those in Pennsylvania where Cosby will be 
tried, liberally admit prior sexual misconduct evidence to show that the 
defendant’s actions in question were consistent with a plan.  
Prior sexual misconduct, however, is no more likely than other types of 
bad acts to predict future misconduct. Because courts more readily admit 
 
 
   Associate Dean for Faculty Research and Scholarship and Professor of Law, Duquesne 
University. B.A., J.D., University of Virginia; LL.M., J.S.D., Yale. 
 1. Sydney Ember & Graham Bowley, Bill Cosby Charged in Sexual Assault Case, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 30, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/31/business/media/bill-cosby-charged-in-sexual-
assault-case.html.  
 2. See, e.g., Noreen Malone & Amanda Demme, ‘I’m No Longer Afraid’: 35 Women Tell Their 
Stories About Being Assaulted by Bill Cosby, and the Culture that Wouldn’t Listen, N.Y. MAG. (July 
26, 2015, 9:00 PM), http://nymag.com/thecut/2015/07/bill-cosbys-accusers-speak-out.html.  
 3. 29 AM. JUR. 2D Evidence § 368 (2016); see also generally FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1). 
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prior acts to predict future conduct when the acts are of a sexual nature, it 
seems likely that Cosby’s other accusers will be allowed to testify. The 
result in this case seems correct, but the logic is certainly questionable. 
If fifty store clerks had come forward and accused Bill Cosby of petty 
larceny, their testimony would powerfully undermine his claims of 
innocence in a shoplifting trial. The power of the testimony of Cosby’s 
other accusers lies in the number of similar accusations, not the fact that 
all the accusations involve sexual misconduct. Courts, however, tend to 
ask whether the uncharged acts fit into a defined category in deciding 
whether to admit this sort of otherwise inadmissible character evidence. 
Courts do not usually critically ask about the value of the other alleged 
misdeeds in determining the disputed facts. The testimony of fifty other 
larceny victims is therefore generally not admissible, but the testimony of 
one other rape victim often is.   
For the wrong reasons, the law is likely to arrive at the right answer in 
the Cosby case.  
I. THE EXCEPTION LADEN PROHIBITION ON A DEFENDANT’S UNCHARGED 
CONDUCT 
It is difficult to explain to a non-lawyer why a defendant’s prior bad 
acts generally cannot be used to determine whether he committed the 
criminal act with which he is charged. It is generally accepted that 
previous criminal conduct increases the odds that the defendant engaged in 
subsequent criminal conduct.
4
 This is just common sense. The prohibition 
on character evidence is therefore often justified by a concern that the jury 
will over-rely on the probative weight of his prior bad acts, giving them 
more weight than they deserve, not that a defendant’s character has no 
relevance in assessing his guilt.
5
 An extreme version of this concern is that 
a defendant may be convicted because of his past alone.
6
 If the admission 
of a defendant’s prior bad acts has the potential to work this sort of 
mischief, then it is difficult to explain anything other than the rare and 
 
 
 4. See Chris William Sanchirico, Character Evidence and the Object of Trial, 101 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1227, 1246 (2001) (noting that “most” seem to agree that character evidence has probative 
value).  
 5. See, e.g., Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475–76 (1948) (footnote omitted) 
(“[I]nquiry [into a defendant’s prior bad acts] is not rejected because character is irrelevant; on the 
contrary, it is said to weigh too much with the jury and to so overpersuade them as to prejudge one 
with a bad general record and deny him a fair opportunity to defend against a particular charge.”).  
 6. See Paul S. Milich, The Degrading Character Rule in American Criminal Trials, 47 GA. L. 
REV. 775, 781–90 (2013). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss4/10
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exceptional admission of such evidence. Yet, the rules of evidence allow 
bad acts to be admitted somewhat commonly. 
While evidence codes prohibit the use of a defendant’s character to 
show that he committed the act in question, the drafters of the rules 
hedged their bets with a litany of exceptions. The Federal Rules of 
Evidence, largely adopted by most states,
7
 provide that “[e]vidence of a 
crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person’s character 
in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in 
accordance with the character.”
8
 But in the next provision, these same 
rules provide that “[t]his evidence may be admissible for another purpose, 
such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.”
9
 
Character evidence is thus governed by a contradiction. The rules of 
evidence essentially say evidence of a defendant’s propensity to commit 
bad acts cannot be used to show that he committed a bad act on a 
particular occasion. But a defendant’s propensity to have a particular 
intent,
10
 for instance, can be used to demonstrate that he possessed that 
intent on a particular occasion.  
In a classic case, a postal carrier was accused of stealing a silver dollar 
from his mail route.
11
 To rebut a claim that he had no intention of keeping 
the coin, the prosecution introduced credit cards belonging to others on his 
mail route that were found in his wallet at the time of his arrest.
12
 
Doctrinally, courts reason that such testimony is admissible because it is 
offered not to prove the defendant’s propensity to commit theft, but as 
evidence demonstrating the defendant’s intent to permanently deprive the 
rightful owner of the coin mailed to him. In other words, the prosecution is 
permitted to introduce evidence of the defendant’s propensity to possess 
the intent to permanently deprive, but not evidence of the defendant’s 
propensity to steal. The distinction is difficult to grasp even for people 
who parse such language for a living. 
The exceptions certainly do not limit character evidence to prior acts 
that show an individual’s intent. The rules of evidence permit prosecutors, 
 
 
 7. See, e.g., David N. Dreyer et al., Dancing with the Big Boys: Georgia Adopts (Most of) the 
Federal Rules of Evidence, 63 MERCER L. REV. 1, 2 (2011) (observing that Georgia had become the 
forty-fourth state to adopt evidence rules based on the federal rules).  
 8. FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(1). 
 9. FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(2).  
 10. Id. 
 11. See United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 903 (5th Cir. 1978). 
 12. Id. at 904. 
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in a variety of circumstances, to use the past to predict the future, so long 
as the particular type of prediction is identified in the rule. If the past is 
used to suggest that in the future the defendant had knowledge or motive, 
the evidence is admissible to show the defendant’s mental state (i.e., his 
mens rea).
13
 Prior bad acts are also admissible to show actus reus—to 
show that the defendant actually committed the act in question. Otherwise 
inadmissible character evidence may be offered to show identity or 
common plan.
14
 Contrary to the prohibition in the evidentiary rules on 
admitting evidence to show a defendant’s propensity, the rules governing 
character evidence very much permit proof of a defendant’s propensity. 
The rules simply require the prosecutor to identify a particular type of 
propensity from the list provided in Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), or in 
the corresponding state evidence code.  
Consider, as an example, the use of other acts offered to show identity. 
A defendant’s other crimes can be offered to establish his identity if they 
are sufficiently similar to the crime in question. The previous crime the 
defendant is known to have committed may be admitted if it is so similar 
to the charged crime that it can be said to bear the defendant’s unique 
signature.
15
 Such proof is often referred to as common plan or modus 
operandi evidence.
16
 Despite the efforts of the drafters of the rules of 
evidence to obfuscate this point, modus operandi is propensity.   
The rules allow prosecutors to show that a defendant has a propensity 
for committing a crime in a very specific way, just as prosecutors can 
introduce evidence to show that a defendant has a propensity to have a 
particular type of intent. Yet the rules refuse to expressly acknowledge that 
the evidence can be admitted to show a type of propensity. Instead the 
rules seem to state that other acts used to show identity or intent, for 
instance, do not involve propensity at all. There is a real downside to this 
lack of candor. Rather than requiring prosecutors to demonstrate the 
likelihood that the defendant committed the prior uncharged misconduct 
and the current act in dispute, the rules allow in evidence of widely 
varying probative value that fit into identified exceptions. 
 
 
 13. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b).  
 14. Id. 
 15. See 3 MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 404:5 (7th ed. 2015) 
(“[W]here evidence of a prior offense is offered to establish that the commission of both crimes were 
committed by the same individual, referred to as evidence of modus operandi, the two offenses must 
be so nearly identical and unusual and distinctive in method as to ear-mark them both as the handiwork 
of the same person—be like a signature.”).  
 16. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss4/10
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II. THE PROBLEMATIC BASIS FOR ADMITTING UNCHARGED CONDUCT IN 
SEX CRIMES PROSECUTIONS 
In sexual misconduct prosecutions, courts and rule makers are 
particularly prone to admit propensity evidence. Rules of evidence, and 
their interpretation by courts, have made prior acts of sexual misconduct 
more readily admissible than other types of specific bad acts to show that 
the defendant’s conduct in the present case is consistent with a previously 
executed plan or scheme.   
In federal court, all acts of sexual misconduct are admissible in civil or 
criminal cases involving allegations of sexual assault.
17
 Responding to 
public concern that the criminal justice system was unable to protect 
society from sexual predators, Congress in 1994 amended the Federal 
Rules of Evidence to expressly allow the admission of prior sexual 
misconduct in a prosecution, or civil case, involving any sort of sexual 
assault.
18
 Proponents of this rule claim that the rate of recidivism for 
sexual offenders is sufficiently high that an accused’s prior sexual 
misconduct should be considered in determining whether he committed 
the charged conduct.
19
 Another provision of the Federal Rules of Evidence 
requires that the probative value of any piece of evidence be weighed 
against its prejudicial impact.
20
 In light of the new rules that expressly 
permit all sexual misconduct for any purpose, including propensity, 
federal courts tend to find that the balance between probative and 
prejudicial value of this sort of evidence should be struck more strongly 
than it ordinarily is in favor of the party offering the evidence.
21
 
Drafters of state evidence codes have generally not followed the lead of 
the drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
22
 likely because recidivism 
 
 
 17. See FED. R. EVID. 413–15. 
 18. See, e.g., R. Wade King, Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 414: By Answering the Public’s 
Call for Increased Protection from Sexual Predators, Did Congress Move Too Far Toward 
Encouraging Conviction Based on Character Rather than Guilt?, 33 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1167, 1169 
(2002).  
 19. See, e.g., Sherry L. Scott, Comment, Fairness to the Victim: Federal Rules of Evidence 413 
and 414 Admit Propensity Evidence in Sexual Offender Trials, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 1729, 1747 (1999).  
 20. See FED. R. EVID. 403. 
 21. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Palumbo, Ensuring Fairness and Justice Through Consistency: 
Application of the Rule 403 Balancing Test to Determine Admissibility of Evidence of a Criminal 
Defendant’s Prior Sexual Misconduct Under the Federal Rules, 9 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 1, 13–17 
(2012). 
 22. See Adam Kargman, Note, Three Maelstroms and One Tweak: Federal Rules of Evidence 
413 to 415 and Their Arizona Counterpart, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 963, 965 (1999) (“Due to the criticism 
against FRE 413 to 415 . . . states have been reluctant to promulgate FRE 413 to 415.”); Jessica D. 
Khan, Note, He Said, She Said, She Said: Why Pennsylvania Should Adopt Federal Rules of Evidence 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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rates are not significantly higher in sexual assault cases than they are in, 
for instance, larceny cases.
23
 State courts, however, have been quite liberal 
in allowing prior acts of sexual misconduct to be admitted as evidence of a 
common plan.
24
  
Even in states that have not adopted the federal rules that admit all 
sexual misconduct, some courts embrace a common law lustful disposition 
exception.
25
 This exception essentially mirrors the recently-promulgated 
federal rules admitting all character evidence involving sexual 
misconduct.
26
 Even states that have not formally adopted a version of the 
lustful disposition exception have been quite liberal in admitting prior acts 
of sexual misconduct under the common plan exception.
27
 Prior acts may 
 
 
413 and 414, 52 VILL. L. REV. 641, 645 (2007) (observing that as of 2007, only ten states had adopted 
these provisions).  
 23. See, e.g., Christina E. Wells & Erin Elliott Motley, Reinforcing the Myth of the Crazed 
Rapist: A Feminist Critique of Recent Rape Legislation, 81 B.U. L. REV. 127, 158 (2001) (noting that 
recidivism rates are not higher for sexual assault cases). Courts have generally interpreted Rules 413, 
414, and 415 to create a presumption of admissibility. See, e.g., Aviva Orenstein, Deviance, Due 
Process, and the False Promise of Federal Rule of Evidence 403, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1487, 1519–24 
(2005). 
 24. See, e.g., Reeves v. State, 755 S.E.2d 695, 698 (Ga. 2014); Jeannie Mayre Mar, Washington’s 
Expansion of the “Plan” Exception After State v. Lough, 71 WASH. L. REV. 845, 862 (1996) 
(observing that the Washington Supreme Court “seems to have fallen into the trap of treating cases 
involving sex crimes differently from cases involving other offenses”); Troy W. Purinton, Call It a 
“Plan” and a Defendant’s Prior (Similar) Sexual Misconduct Is In: The Disappearance of K.S.A. 60-
455, 70 J. KAN. B. ASS’N 30, 32 (2001) (“The Kansas Supreme Court has limited to sexual misconduct 
cases the more liberal standard allowing admission of plan evidence . . . .”); see also David P. Bryden 
& Roger C. Park, “Other Crimes” Evidence in Sex Offense Cases, 78 MINN. L. REV. 529, 534 (1994) 
(“Courts often admit such evidence [of other acts of sexual misconduct] . . . either on the ground that is 
it relevant for some purpose other than to show the accused’s character, or on the ground that it falls 
within a recognized exception to the rule against character evidence.”). 
 25. See, e.g., Karen M. Fingar, And Justice for All: The Admissibility of Uncharged Sexual 
Misconduct Evidence Under the Recent Amendment to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 5 S. CAL. REV. 
L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 501, 524–25 (1996) (observing that “several jurisdictions” admit evidence of 
sexual misconduct “under a ‘lustful disposition’ or ‘depraved sexual instinct’ exception”); Lisa M. 
Segal, Note, The Admissibility of Uncharged Misconduct Evidence in Sex Offense Cases: New Federal 
Rules of Evidence Codify the Lustful Disposition Exception, 29 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 515, 526–27 
(1995) (“During the twentieth century, common-law courts created the lustful disposition exception 
. . . .”).  
 26. See Basyle J. Tchividjian, Predators and Propensity: The Proper Approach for Determining 
the Admissibility of Prior Bad Acts Evidence in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 39 AM. J. CRIM. L. 
327, 341 (2012) (noting that new federal rules are “the codification of the lustful disposition 
exception”). 
 27. See, e.g., John David Collins, Character Evidence and Sex Crimes in Alabama: Moving 
Toward the Adoption of New Federal Rules 413, 414 & 415, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1651, 1665 (2000) 
(“Although Alabama courts have never explicitly recognized a ‘lustful disposition’ exception to the 
general exclusionary rule of character, they have traditionally liberalized the application of the ‘intent’ 
and ‘identity’ doctrines in order to accommodate the admission of collateral sexual misconduct 
evidence.”); Brian E. Lam, Note, The Admissibility of Prior Bad Acts in Sexual Assault Cases Under 
Alaska Rule of Evidence 404(b)—An Emerging Double Standard, 5 ALASKA L. REV. 193, 194 (1988); 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss4/10
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be admitted under this common law exception to show identity and to 
show that the defendant did not mistakenly believe his victim consented.
28
 
Often, the so-called signature aspects of the prior acts, that are technically 
necessary to show a common plan or absence of mistake,
29
 are fairly 
common to many sex crimes.  
Pennsylvania, the jurisdiction in which Bill Cosby has been charged, 
only permits evidence of a lustful disposition toward the same victim.
30
 
But, like other jurisdictions,
31
 for other victims Pennsylvania requires very 
little commonality between the prior and the charged sexual misconduct. 
A very recent example illustrates the willingness of Pennsylvania courts to 
stretch the common plan exception in sex crime prosecutions.
32
 On June 
10, 2015, the Pennsylvania Superior Court, the first level of appeal for 
criminal cases in the Commonwealth, decided that similarities between a 
defendant’s rape charge and his prior rape conviction were sufficient to be 
admitted as evidence of a common plan.
33
  
The defendant in Commonwealth v. Tyson was charged with raping a 
woman in 2010, and he had been convicted of raping another woman over 
five years earlier.
34
 In the 2010 case, Tyson had gone to the victim’s 
home, whom he casually knew, to bring her some food as she was feeling 
ill after donating plasma.
35
 He stayed at her apartment that night. She 
awoke to him having vaginal intercourse with her and told him to stop, 
which he did.
36
 The victim went back to sleep, awoke at some point, and 
went to the kitchen where she found Tyson naked.
37
 She again informed 
him that she did not wish to have sex with him, but let him continue to 
 
 
see also R. P. Davis, Annotation, Admissibility, in Prosecution for Sexual Offense, of Evidence of 
Other Similar Offenses, 77 A.L.R.2d 841 (1961); sources cited supra note 24. 
 28. See Katharine K. Baker, Once a Rapist? Motivational Evidence and Relevancy in Rape Law, 
110 HARV. L. REV. 563, 613 (1997).  
 29. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Kinard, 95 A.3d 279, 294–95 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014) (citation 
omitted) (stating that other acts admitted to show absence of mistake must be “remarkably similar” to 
charged offense); Commonwealth v. Frank, 577 A.2d 609, 614 (Pa. 1990) (stating that to introduce 
evidence under the common plan exception, the other acts must be “distinctive and so nearly identical 
as to become the signature of the same perpetrator”).  
 30. See Khan, supra note 22, at 645–46. 
 31. See, e.g., Mar, supra note 24, at 862–65 (describing unique treatment of character evidence 
in sexual offense prosecutions in Washington).  
 32. See Commonwealth v. Tyson, 119 A.3d 353 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015). 
 33. Id. at 363.  
 34. Id. at 356–57. 
 35. Id. at 356. 
 36. Id.  
 37. Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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stay in her apartment, and went back to bed.
38
 Later that night, she again 
awoke to find him having vaginal intercourse with her.
39
  
In 2001, Tyson similarly was accused of having sex with a woman 
while she slept. In the 2001 case, however, Tyson was not accused of 
abusing the trust the victim wrongly placed in her attacker. Instead, Tyson 
had attended a party, drank, and stayed until fairly late. After at least some 
of the residents of the home had gone to bed, he went into the bedroom 
belonging to the sister of the party host, and started having sex with the 
sister while she slept.
40
 Other than the fact that both incidents involved sex 
with women in their sleep, these incidents seem fairly dissimilar.
41
  
Despite the fact that Pennsylvania requires two crimes to be “so nearly 
identical in method as to earmark them as the handiwork of the accused” 
to qualify for either the common scheme or absence of mistake 
exception,
42
 the majority found the prior rape to be admissible.
43
 The 
similarities the court noted, none of which seemed to uniquely earmark the 
crimes, were:  
In each case, Appellee was acquainted with the victim—a black 
female in her twenties—and he was an invited guest in the victim's 
home. Appellee was aware that each victim was in a weakened or 
compromised state. Each victim ultimately lost consciousness. In 
each case, the victim awoke in her bedroom in the early morning 
hours to find Appellee having vaginal intercourse with her.
44
 
III. THE DOCTRINE OF CHANCES AS A BASIS FOR ADMITTING THE 
TESTIMONY OF MULTIPLE ACCUSERS 
Even in its boldest form, it is no more difficult to explain a lustful 
disposition exception than the intent exception, or any of the exceptions 
for that matter. Each is nothing more than a willingness to tolerate 
evidence of a particular type of propensity, with no particular justification 
for treating any particular type of propensity evidence differently. Yet 
 
 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 365 (Donohue, J., dissenting). 
 41. The dissent observed that the majority was essentially concluding that any two acts of sexual 
misconduct toward one physically incapable of consenting were sufficiently similar to be admitted 
under PA. R. EVID. 404(b). Id. at 366.  
 42. Commonwealth v. Roney, 79 A.3d 595, 606 (Pa. 2013) (quoting Commonwealth v. Bryant, 
530 A.2d 83, 85 (Pa. 1987) (citations omitted)). 
 43. Tyson, 119 A.3d at 363. 
 44. Id. at 360. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss4/10
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some applications of these exceptions have strong intuitive appeal. It 
seems reasonable to consider the fact that the postman in Beechum had 
credit cards in his wallet that had been mailed months earlier to residents 
on his mail route in evaluating what his intentions were toward the silver 
dollar he also possessed.
45
 But the fact that this evidence fits into one of 
the categorical exceptions to the prohibition on introducing other bad acts 
does not seem like the basis for that intuition. 
A different explanation is sometimes offered for permitting evidence of 
other bad acts in criminal cases—the doctrine of chances.
46
 Essentially, 
this explanation replaces the hodgepodge of exceptions with a single 
question: how likely is it that the defendant is guilty of the first crime and 
innocent of the second?
47
 The doctrine of chances expressly asks how 
likely is the evidence to show a very particular type of propensity.
48
 The 
more similar the uncharged acts are to the charged acts, and the more 
numerous the uncharged acts, the greater the likelihood the defendant is 
guilty of the charged offense.
49
 The doctrine of chances candidly 
recognizes that the evidence is admissible to show propensity, but insists 
that the uncharged acts be highly predictive of the charged acts.
50
 
Reconsider the Beechum case in light of the question that the doctrine 
of chances asks a court to evaluate: what are the odds that the defendant is 
innocent of the charged and uncharged conduct? The court reasoned that 
because the uncharged conduct was probative of the defendant’s state of 
 
 
 45. See United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 904 (5th Cir. 1978). 
 46. See, e.g., Edward J. Imwinkelried, A Small Contribution to the Debate over the Proposed 
Legislation Abolishing the Character Evidence Prohibition in Sex Offense Prosecutions, 44 SYRACUSE 
L. REV. 1125, 1133 (1993). 
 47. See, e.g., Paul F. Rothstein, Intellectual Coherence in an Evidence Code, 28 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 1259, 1263 (1995) (“The doctrine says that the evidence is admissible if it is unlikely that an 
innocent person would be falsely charged so many times . . . .”). 
 48. See id. at 1261. 
 49. Rothstein calls this “specific propensity” and argues that it is very different in degree from 
bad character. A propensity to commit a very specific type of crime is very different from having bad 
character, he concludes. Id. at 1264.  
 50. There is some debate about whether the doctrine of chances actually involves propensity. 
Edward Imwinkelried, perhaps the strongest proponent of the doctrine, argues that it is not evidence of 
propensity. Imwinkelried argues that the doctrine “has nothing whatever to do with the accused’s 
character; rather, the inference relates to the objective improbability of a large number of similar, false 
complaints against the same accused.” Imwinkelreid, supra note 46, at 1137. Paul Rothstein has 
cogently argued that the doctrine must be about propensity. Rothstein contends that “[t]he essence of 
this probable guilt argument is that there is a disparity between the chances, or probability that an 
innocent person would be charged so many times and the chances, or probability, that a guilty person 
would be charged so many times. If there is such a disparity, however, it is only because a guilty 
person would have the propensity to repeat the crime.” Rothstein, supra note 47, at 1262–63 (emphasis 
added). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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mind, the evidence was admissible.
51
 Intuitively, the court’s decision to 
admit the evidence feels right, but not because the credit cards in the 
postman’s wallet provided evidence of the defendant’s mens rea on 
another occasion. Intuitively, the court’s answer feels right because the 
odds that the postman stole two credit cards from residents on his route 
and planned to permanently deprive the owner of the silver coin on his 
route seem astronomically high. 
Using the doctrine of chances in a case like the prosecution of Bill 
Cosby would represent an important but not radical departure from the 
current method of evaluating the admissibility of other uncharged acts of 
sexual misconduct. The doctrine of chances resembles common plan, or 
modus operandi, analysis that courts presently use in sexual assault cases. 
Each looks to the similarity of the acts and the likelihood that one act 
permits conclusions to be drawn about another act. The doctrine of 
chances, however, expressly considers the number of uncharged acts as 
well as the similarities between the two acts. As Professor Wigmore 
described the doctrine, it is “that logical process which eliminates the 
element of innocent intent by multiplying instances of the same result until 
it is perceived that this element cannot explain them all.”
52
  
As a Pennsylvania court, and indeed the world, will consider the 
appropriateness of considering the testimony of the many accusers against 
Bill Cosby, the basis for permitting exceptions to propensity evidence 
ought to be reconsidered. Intuitively, it seems implausible that one person 
would be falsely accused of rape on a number of occasions. Over fifty 
women claim that the comedian sexually assaulted them.
53
 While many of 
the women claim they did not know they were being given drugs of any 
kind, a number of those women claim that Cosby offered them pills of 
some sort. Some say that they asked him for an aspirin; others, such as the 
alleged victim in the criminal case against him, say that he offered them 
pills. These women then recount the pills making them unconscious, or 
semi-conscious, and Cosby taking advantage of their inability to resist.
54
 
 
 
 51. United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 904 (5th Cir. 1978). 
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And, of course, Cosby admitted in a 2005 deposition that he gave women 
Quaaludes to have sex with them.
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Many sexual assault cases, such as this one, lack physical evidence. 
This case, like many, is all about the credibility of the witnesses. The odds 
that Andrea Constand is telling the truth about Cosby giving her a pill that 
rendered her incapable of consent, or even escape, are dramatically higher 
if a number of other women have almost exactly the same story. The odds 
of unfair prejudice from these prior bad acts decrease both with the 
similarity and number of misdeeds. The admissibility of testimony from 
the other alleged victims should not merely, or even primarily, turn on the 
fact that Cosby’s alleged past misdeeds are sexual. The categorical 
exception the Federal Rules of Evidence and many states have provided 
for prior sexual misdeeds—and the de facto exception many other states 
have fashioned for such other bad acts—do not explain what makes the 
testimony of Cosby’s many accusers not only highly relevant, but 
compelling. 
A test that considers both the nature and number of prior bad acts, 
charged or uncharged, in considering whether to admit this sort of 
character evidence would cabin the use of such evidence to the most 
appropriate circumstances. It would further offer the public, in a trial that 
promises to be one of the most watched in American history, a better 
explanation for the exception to the general prohibition on introducing 
character evidence against a criminal defendant. Adopting the doctrine of 
chances in Cosby’s case would require courts to be candid about the fact 
that the law is sometimes willing to consider the predictive value of past 
acts. To put it another way, courts would have to acknowledge that they 
sometimes consider a defendant’s character, despite a rule of evidence that 
expressly forbids the use of character evidence. Embracing the doctrine of 
chances to admit evidence of multiple accusers would, however, 
demonstrate that the rules of procedure do not have to defy common sense.  
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